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The Idea of Arbitration is authored by Jan Paulsson, the Michael Klein 
Distinguished Scholar Chair at the University of Miami School of Law.1 Paulsson is an 
internationally recognized figure in the field of international arbitration. He is a former 
President of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, immediate past 
President of the LCIA, a former Vice-President of the International Court of Arbitration 
of the International Chamber of Commerce, a member of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague, a board member of the American Arbitration Association, and 
a member of the Singapore International Arbitration Court.2 He is President of the 
Administrative Tribunal of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a 
Judge of the IMF Administrative Tribunal, and past President of the World Bank 
Administrative Tribunal.3 Paulsson is also a founding partner of Three Crowns LLP, a 
boutique international arbitration firm located in Washington DC, London, and Paris.4 
Paulsson wrote this book to offer a theoretical foundation for understanding how 
arbitration functions in society.5 He poses fundamental questions such as, “what makes us 
confide in an arbitrator?” and “when arbitrators have been chosen, may their conduct or 
decisions be questioned?”.6 It was Paulsson’s theoretical goal to examine whether the 
arbitral process, which has proven itself to be a “valuable social institution,” will   
continue to be valuable and adaptive to the many challenges it faces today.7 The 
methodological premise of this book is to present the materials of the book in a way that 
even readers with little to no arbitration knowledge will be stimulated and able to discuss 
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This book is an excellent tool for law students, legal professors, and practitioners 
alike. It examines fundamental ideas relevant to arbitration that challenge any reader to 




The Idea of Arbitration is comprised of nine chapters which can be grouped into 
three parts: the past, present, and future of arbitration. Part One, which includes Chapter 
One, speculates about the past and why we as a society choose to arbitrate. Part Two 
consists of seven chapters that attempt to look carefully at the present state of arbitration. 
Within Part Two, the chapters discuss topics such as the legal foundations of arbitration 
(Chapter Two), public policy limitations (Chapter Four), and even the inadequacies of 
arbitration (Chapter Five), just to name a few. Part Three, the final chapter, focuses on 
the future of arbitration. 
 
III.   PART ONE: CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPULSE TO ARBITRATE 
 
“The idea of arbitration is that of binding resolution of disputes accepted with 
serenity by those who bear its consequences because of their special trust in chosen 
decision-makers.”8 This is Paulsson’s thesis laid out in the first sentence of his book. 
What kind of entity can achieve this level of acceptance? Surely not courts, Paulsson 
suggests.9 Courts cannot achieve this goal because courts are forced to struggle with 
philosophical ideas of a “social contract” that often lacks any mooring to reality.10 
Arbitration, on the other hand, can achieve that goal because arbitration is freedom 
reconciled with law.11 Acceptance of arbitration is a distinguishing feature of free 
societies.12 Paulsson hypothesizes this because most people find it demeaning to be told 
what to do and fear abuse from those in power.13 
However, there is a paradox because people want freedom, yet they also want 
law.14 Generally, people are willing to give up some of their freedom for a bargain, such 
as avowing oneself to criminal laws so to obtain protection by those same laws.15 This 
 
 














15 Id. at 2. 
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bargain also applies to reckless behavior in the hopes that society as a whole will behave 
more prudently and to contracts in that we accept a bad bargain because, on the whole, 
we want contracts to be final and binding.16 We accept the “rule of law,” yet there is a lot 
of hesitation to do so because each of us individuals have varying degrees of perceptions 
and interactions with the law.17 As Paulsson so eloquently puts it, “[w]e want the rule of 
law, not rule by law.”18 Beyond the rule of law, individuals want their own law.19 The 
idea of arbitration stems from this notion.20 
In this first chapter, Paulsson explores the history of the idea of arbitration and 
poses an important question of whether any common organizing principles remain to be 
kept for use in today’s society.21 
The first historical principle explored is the arbitrator as archetype.22 Paulsson 
discusses the psychologist Carl Jung’s concept of psychological archetypes.23 In Jung's 
psychological context, archetypes are innate, universal prototypes for ideas and may be 
used to interpret observations.24 When someone thinks of an ideal arbitrator it is 
suggested that maybe he or she thinks of an idealized form of himself or herself.25 
Next, Paulsson examines the attributes of the arbitrator as archetype: 
commitment, capability, concern, attentiveness to consequences, and condignity.26 
Commitment is summed up as the parties desire for an arbitrator who is 
personally and deeply engaged in the task at hand, which is resolving a dispute and 
preventing infectious conflict.27 An arbitrator’s capability is based on his or her 
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and gains the respect of arbitrants.29 Paulsson discusses concern for the arbitrants as an 
vital attribute much like the skills and attitudes of good parents.30 He says that the 
archetype does not “anesthetize his heart,” but has personal and benign interest in the 
parties.31 
Of all the attributes, attentiveness to consequences presents an interesting 
difficulty for an arbitrator because there is a tension between deciding every case as 
though it were the arbitrator’s last and thinking about arbitrating future disputes.32 How 
an arbitrator is perceived affects the ideal of an arbitrator’s individualized approach to 
every dispute.33 
Lastly, condignity means that the arbitrator issues awards or punishments that are 
merited or warranted, and are not the product of the arbitrators disposition, favor, or 
generosity, but of a just awareness of the appropriate consequences of the parties’ 
conduct.34 All of these attributes show that the idea of arbitration is above all a 
transformation from some features of the imagined “judicial temperament,” such as an 
impersonal attitude and an indifference to the parties.35 
Following the discussion of the archetype arbitrator’s attributes, Paulsson 
discusses the uncertain historical parallels stating that it is usual for advocates of any 
institution to invoke historical pedigree in an attempt to demonstrate that their institution 
echoes the wisdom of the ages.36 Through his example of ancient Islamic law traditions  
of arbitration, Paulsson questions such historic parallels and states, “there is, in sum, 
nothing eternal or inevitable about arbitration; it must find its meaning and its acceptance 
in the modern world it purports to serve. It cannot be static.”37 
Next, Chapter One focuses on ambivalence towards law.38 The idea of arbitration 
looks to a decision viewed by the parties and their peers as in agreement with legitimate 
expectations, with no thirst for legal convention or modification beyond that of a fair 
hearing.39 Paulsson posits that arbitration is a quest for civilized closure.40 
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36 Id. at 10. 
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To bring Chapter One to a close there is discussion of messy realities and the 
quest for a more noble court system.41 Paulsson explains that the presumption in a free 
society should be that citizens may develop ways to resolve their disputes by means they 
find attractive and particularly suited to their activity and character, even if those 
approaches bear little similarity to procedures which a legislature might develop for 
general use.42 Arbitration will better succeed and the best results will be achieved in 
societies where judges and arbitrators (courts and arbitration) see themselves as engaged 
in a collaborative undertaking in the interest of justice because common sense tells us that 
a place where the courts perform poorly is not likely to be good for arbitration, nor is a 
place where arbitration is dominated by never-ending judicial corrections one where the 
courts are to be admired.43 
Chapter One is vital to the understanding of The Idea of Arbitration. As it 
explores arbitration’s past it sets the important foundation for every chapter that follows. 
Chapter One establishes the roots of society’s current perceptions and views about 
arbitration and arbitrators. It accurately sets the stage for the rest of the book in a very 
user-friendly form that readers will find inviting and educational. 
 




A.  Chapter Two: The Legal Foundation of Arbitration 
 
Chapter Two focuses on the specifically legal foundations of arbitration, rather 
than philosophical or political. 44 “The law applicable to arbitration is not the law 
applicable in arbitration.”45 The law applicable in arbitration offers standards to guide 
arbitrators decisions whereas the law applicable to arbitration refers to the basis of 
arbitrators authority and of the status of their decision.46 
This chapter begins by displaying the “great paradox of arbitration” which is that 






40 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 13. 
 
41 Id. at 18-28 
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44 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 4. 
 




itself.47 Paulsson asks several questions relating to this paradox such as what will courts 
tolerate and to what will they offer their authority and supremacy?48 
These questions are examined through four competing proposals. The first is 
referred to as territorial thesis which holds that any arbitration is unavoidably national, it 
functions according to the law of the place of arbitration.49 The second is called the 
pluralistic thesis which holds that arbitration may be given influence by more than one 
legal state, none of them inevitably crucial.50 The third proposal is that arbitration is the 
creation of an autonomous legal order accepted as such by arbitrators and judges.51 The 
fourth and final proposition is that arbitration may be effective under provisions that do 
not depend on national law or judges at all.52 Paulsson concludes that the fourth 
proposition ultimately merges with the pluralistic thesis and expands it: it accounts for a 
feature of pluralism in the domination.53 Chapter Two focuses a majority of its pages on 
the territorial thesis and the pluralistic thesis. 
The territorial thesis is summed up by Paulsson as follows, “Our planet is divided 
into plot, each attributed to a jealous state. What happens within that plot can have no 
legal significance if it is not given that effect by those who exercise power in the name of 
the state holding dominion there.”54 This thesis is outdated, but its influence lingers.55 
Francis Mann is the leading advocate of the territorial thesis.56 In his essay titled ‘Lex 
Facit Arbitrum’57 he focused on the law applied by arbitrators and not the legal 
foundation of arbitration.58 The central principle of his essay was that arbitrators must 
obey the private international law of the seat of arbitration.59 
 
 
47 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 30; see also Alan Scott Rau, Arbitration and National Courts: Conflict and 
Cooperation: Understanding (And Misunderstanding) “Primary Jurisdiction,” 21 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 47 
(2010) (discussing both the vertical and horizontal relationships between courts and arbitration). 
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57 ‘the law makes the arbitrator’ 
 




Paulsson criticizes Mann and the territorial thesis because it is not apt in today’s 
world.60 He cites examples such as how Switzerland allows parties to opt out of any 
judicial review of awards involving only foreign interests and, more fundamentally, that 
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards mandates enforcement of arbitral awards without the need for any manifestation 
of approval of the courts of the place of arbitration.61 The territorial thesis simply does 
not fit with the realities of today’s international society that is no longer constrained 
within national units.62 
The pluralistic thesis contends that the forces of internationalization have now 
fashioned awards which do not owe their power to the law of the place of arbitration.63 
Paulsson gives an example of what he refers to as a “delocalized award” where   
arbitration takes place in Country A and an award is rendered there subject to court 
appeal.64 Normally, other countries are prepared to enforce this foreign award only if they 
are satisfied that the award is binding.65 Country A may have laws that determine if an 
award is binding perhaps if that award has resisted appeal or no appeal has been final.66 
Country B, however, can legislate a rule that an award, wherever rendered, is binding for 
the enforcement in B at the moment it is pronounced.67 
This “delocalization,” or as Paulsson calls it “plurilocalization,” refers to the 
possibility that an award may be accepted by the legal order of an enforcement 
jurisdiction whether or not the legal order of its country of origin has also embraced it.68 
National legal orders assert supremacy in their national space, and they may decree that 
the same facts command different results.69 
Chapter Two’s focus on the legal foundation for arbitration, namely the territorial 
and pluralistic approaches, is concise and straightforwardly explained through the use of 
simple examples that help flesh out these propositions. After reading this chapter, readers 




















68 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 36. 
 
69 Id. at 37. 
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B. Chapter Three: Private Challenges 
 
Chapter Three concentrates on what happens when private parties challenge the 
arbitral process.70 The chapter opens with discussion of front-end and back-end challenges 
to arbitration through court intervention and how if this is allowed arbitration              
loses its appeal.71 Protests to arbitration can arise at the outset, when respondents protest 
their alleged obligation to submit to the process, during the process, when either party 
may complain about how arbitration is being conducted, or after the arbitration, when one 
of the parties may ask a court to set aside the arbitral award.72 
A significant amount of Chapter Three focuses on the front-end protest.73 There 
are four common initial challenges to arbitration: (i) the party never consented to give the 
supposed arbitrator any authority of any kind; or that although it did agree to arbitration: 
(ii) the law prohibits arbitration of the exact claim raised; (iii) the claim falls outside the 
scope of agreement to arbitrate; or (iv) the claim should be dismissed without substantive 
examination because liability is in any event barred by some legal or contractual 
impediment.74 
The first of these objections is a jurisdictional challenge that Paulsson discusses at 
some length.75 When is a controversy about the arbitrator’s authority to be decided and  
by whom?76 Paulsson suggests that the words “I challenge the tribunal’s authority” must 
not be an “abracadabra” that allows arbitration disappear lest arbitration lose its allure.77 
Paulsson posits that arbitrators must have the authority to decide whether or not 
they have jurisdiction to hear a particular case.78 This is known as kompetenz- 
kompetenz.79 Without this fundamental principle, the weakest challenge would stop the 
arbitration, and parties to entirely legitimate arbitration agreements would be thrust into 
the courts when that is exactly against their bargain in the first place.80 Paulsson uses a 
 
 
70 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 4. 
 






74 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 51. 
 






78 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 54. 
 
79 Id.; see generally Ashley Cook, Kompetenz-Kompetenz: Varying Approaches and a Proposal for a 
Limited Form of Negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 2014 PEPP. L. REV. 17 (2014) (analyzing different views 
and approaches to kompetenz-kompetenz). 
 
80 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 54. 
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very simple, logical example to further explain why arbitrators must have this authority to 
decide jurisdiction: without it, he states, the party which rightfully invokes a valid 
arbitration agreement might have to spend a lot of time and resources, including money, in 
court, including various appeals, only to be told after the long judicial process that it     
was correct from the outset, has now been exposed to courts when the avoidance of   
courts was the very reason for their arbitration agreement, and must now start from the 
beginning with a stale case or an impoverished opponent.81 This example illustrates why 
kompetenz-kompetenz, “jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction,” is such a fundamental feature 
of modern arbitration.82 
The French take what they term competence-competence a step further by not 
only empowering the arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction, but also by prohibiting 
the courts in the meantime from determining disputes feasibly covered by arbitration 
agreements.83 
American courts have really grappled and struggled with the idea of  
arbitrability.84 Paulsson goes as far as to propose courts struggle with the use of the word 
arbitrability.85 He lobbies for a more limited definition of the word so as to not include all 
kinds of threshold issues.86 “If the definition of flying is broadened to include jumping, 
kangaroos will be birds. Greater mental discipline is needed.”87 Landmark cases such as 












83 Id. at 58.; see also CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 1448 (Fr.) ("When a dispute subject to an 
arbitration agreement is brought before a court, such court shall decline jurisdiction, except if an arbitral 
tribunal has not been seised of the dispute and if the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or manifestly 
not applicable. A court may not decline jurisdiction of its own motion."). 
 








88 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 US 938 (1995) (holding that the arbitrability of the 
Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts and that, rather than a special 
abuse of discretion standard, courts of appeals should apply ordinary standards when reviewing district 
court decisions upholding arbitration awards). 
 
89 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (holding that the applicability of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers’ time-limit rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator). 
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Financial Corp. v. Bazzle90are discussed at length to further develop the concept of 
arbitrability.91 
A fundamental concept that is present when discussing authority to rule on 
jurisdiction is the idea of separability.92 Separability is of great importance to the 
effectiveness of the arbitration process and can be summarized by the example of a 
respondent arguing that a contract as a whole is invalid; that this is automatically fatal to 
its arbitration clause as well; and that as a consequence there can be no arbitration under 
that clause.93 Arbitration would lose its function if courts accepted this logic.94 Paulsson 
continues with a fascinating, in-depth analysis of separability with various examples and 
illustrations.95 
Chapter Three ends with considerations about why an arbitral tribunal’s decision 
about the admissibility of a claim does not concern the tribunal’s jurisdiction and is 
therefore final, and, finally, a discussion about post-award challenges.96 
This chapter is Paulsson’s greatest triumph in The Idea of Arbitration. It is 
essential that law students studying arbitration read it because it discusses fundamental 
issues with great clarity. His section on separability alone lends great insight into a 
challenging topic. This chapter lays out important issues that law students and practioners 
will be confronted with in the world of arbitration on a regular basis. 
 
C. Chapter Four: The Public Challenge 
 
This chapter introduces the reader to the public policy limitations on arbitration.97 
To what degree will arbitration be accepted by the State, in light of the fact that 
arbitration offers an obvious alternative to state-administered courts?98 
 
 
90 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (holding that an arbitrator must determine whether 
the contracts forbid class arbitration). 
 
91 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 72-77; see also Natasha Wyss, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A 
Perilous Approach to Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 TUL. L. REV. 351 (1997) (discussing the United States 
Supreme Court recognition of the international doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz in light of the Federal 
Arbitration Act and the implications of this landmark court decision). 
 
92 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 60; see also Tanya Monestier, “Nothing Comes of Nothing”...Or Does 
It??? A Critical Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Separability in American Arbitration, 12 AM. REV.  
INT'L ARB. 223 (2001) (discussing that a valid and severable arbitration provision can be contained within a 
contract that never legally materialized while also examining the current view of separability in American 
jurisprudence). 
 




95 Id. at 60-72. 
 
96 Id. at 82-98. 
 
97 Id. at 4. 
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In free societies, what is not explicitly prohibited is allowed.99 Or at least that is 
the presumption.100 Public officials must take the accountability for making their intent 
clear.101 Too many mandatory orders create public alienation and wear away the rule of 
law.102 However, arbitrators do not, unless they are ready to sacrifice the enforcement of 
their awards by State courts, have the authority to disregard the law.103 
Chapter Four begins with a discussion of the tension between public regulation 
and arbitration.104 Some public officials are troubled by arbitration as a potential tool for 
regulatory disobedience.105 One extreme view holds that arbitration shouldn’t exist at all 
because the rule of law is the most fundamental public policy while Paulsson notes that 
the fact that an activity is regulated does not make it off-limits to arbitration.106 However, 
some people believe that arbitration should be tolerated only with caution.107 
The next section of Chapter Four addresses the question “why should arbitration 
be allowed at all?”108 Free societies allow citizens to arrange their affairs as they see fit 
including the freedom to opt for arbitration instead of court systems.109 However, the law 
limits this freedom of contract, and disagreements often involve claims that those limits 




98 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 99. 
 






102 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 100; see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (Yale 
University Press, 1997) (“The better the society, the less law there will be...In hell there will be nothing but 
law, and due process will be meticulously observed.”). 
 
103 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 100; see Kenneth Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: 
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1997) (challenges the assumption that by 
submitting a dispute to arbitration the parties intend to relinquish judicial review of the award. Rather, this 
Article argues that contract analysis of party intent manifested in the arbitration agreement determines the 
scope of judicial review). 
 














disputes without offending the rule of law while also respecting contract freedom.111 
Several public policy limitations are explored, such as how arbitration cannot 
protect conspiracies intended to avoid antitrust laws or the regulation of financial 
institutions and adhesionary arbitration agreements imposed on weaker parties of 
consumers should not be upheld.112 
Most national laws declare agreements to arbitrate unenforceable with respect to 
certain matters.113 Status determinations, family relations, bankruptcy, intellectual 
property, and antitrust are a few of the areas that are off-limits, and while they may seem 
arbitrary there is a common thread of a state’s interest in these matters.114 For example, it 
doesn’t make sense to allow private arbitrators to make marital, retired, or disabled status 
determinations because those categories create entitlements against the state.115 Paulsson 
thinks that the reason for declaring some types of disputes as off-limits has more to do 
with “whether arbitration may significantly affect private or public interests which are 
manifestly unrepresented in an adequate way by the parties or the arbitrator” than the 
acumen level of the arbitrators.116 
The remaining sections of this chapter examine whether parties may agree to be 
bound by arbitral determinations as to the effect of the law, whether it purports to 
complement or to alter their agreements and whether the rule in question is derived from 
ordinary law or from something more fundamental, said to be part of public policy.117 
To end this chapter on public challenges, Paulsson summarizes the degrees of 
arbitral authority beginning with the types of legally important decisions arbitrators have 
clear and final authority to make and moving through decisions that public intervention is 
more and more likely.118 
Chapter Four discusses many fundamental ideas that anyone in the field of 
arbitration needs to understand. Paulsson’s analysis of arbitral authority in light of public 
policy considerations is expansive. The conclusion of this chapter with a concise 








111 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 104. 
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117 Id. at 123-44. 
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D. Chapter Five: Ethical Challenges 
 
The shortcomings of arbitration are the focus of Chapter Five.119 Arbitrations 
Achilles’ heel, from Paulsson’s perspective, is the lack of accountability of arbitrators.120 
Because arbitral awards are not generally subject to appeal, there is no accountability to 
tiered superiors, nor are arbitrators necessarily subject to discipline of a regulated 
profession.121 In Paulsson’s eyes, confidence in the ethical standards of arbitrators and 
arbitral organizations is the “Alpha and the Omega” of the legitimacy of the process.122 
Sundaresh Menon, the then Attorney General of Singapore and soon to be Chief 
Justice of Singapore, delivered a keynote speech in May 2012 at a session of a Congress 
of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration addressing ethical issues facing 
arbitration today.123 He questioned the sustainability of the success of arbitration unless 
the risks that stem from arbitral ambition are better controlled.124 Menon explains that 
there are growing numbers of arbitrators who are “in essence business people in search of 
opportunities,” creating a tension between the self-promoting and self-dealing of the 
arbitrators and their public duty to uphold justice.125 He also addressed how arbitrators are 
invariably profit-driven and biased, or that they always act strategically so they can be 
repeat arbitrators.126 
This keynote address, more or less, sums up Chapter Five. How these ethical 
issues are addressed within the industry are also explored.127 Paulsson thinks that self- 
regulation alone is not enough, that the stakes are too high in arbitration to simply allow 
self-appraisal, peer pressure, or other forms of self-regulation to be the only line of 
defense.128 Arbitral institutions are better suited to meet these ethical challenges, but it is 
unclear if they have acceptable structures to do so.129 If they do not rise to meet these 
 
 
119 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 4. 
 
120 Id. at 147; see also Cameron Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitration and the 
Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1337 (2002) (argues that state oversight of 
arbitrators could begin to insure a level of fairness in arbitration, while preserving arbitration's economic 
benefits). 
 




123 Id.; see also Keynote Address, ICCA Congress Series No. 17: International Arbitration: the Coming of 
a New Age for Asia (and Elsewhere) 6 (2013). 
 
124 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 147. 
 








challenges it is only a matter of time before political actors will step in and regulate 
strictly on a process they do not fully understand which will result in undesirable 
bureaucratization and a gradual destruction of the utilities of arbitration.130 
Paulsson discusses an arbitrators “fitness to serve” at some length. He divides the 
criteria into two categories: integrity and aptitude.131 Integrity is absolutely paramount 
because even great ability can be corrupted which would irreparably flaw the whole 
process of arbitration.132 The integrity category is comprised of the traits of independence 
and impartiality.133 The key issue of independence is whether the arbitrator has an interest 
in the outcome.134 An arbitrator from a law firm which derives substantial revenue from 
one of the parties is a prime example of not being independent.135 Impartiality involves 
examining the case with an open mind.136 
There are many reasons that lead to arbitrator bias such as friendship or 
professional relationships or the desire to please the appointing lawyer or party to gain 
future benefits such as repeat business.137 
At the conclusion of Chapter Five, Paulsson makes the case for an elitist approach 
to the ethical challenges of arbitration.138 He feels that, given the large stakes involved in 
many arbitrations, there should be an elite corps of arbitrators.139 By elite he means that  
of a “meritocracy in terms of substantive competence, procedural adroitness, and above all 
absolute impartiality.”140 This elite corps needs to be several hundred “first-rate” 
commercial arbitrators that is an open shop that crosses cultures, genders, and 
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Paulsson doesn’t understand why or how it is good for the arbitral process if as 
many people as possible can be arbitrators.142 In his opinion, elitism is not a sin and the 
ambition to work at the most elite level is healthy for arbitration.143 The reputation of 
arbitrators grow slowly over time with proof of independence and impartiality.144 
Chapter Five is a great critique of arbitration, namely arbitrators. Paulsson’s fear 
of arbitrator independence and impartiality really shines through. At points, he 
dramatizes the “stakes” of arbitration and makes them feel like life or death matters. 
However, on the whole, this chapter is a strong example of the shortcomings of 
arbitration. 
 
E. Chapters Six Through Eight: The International Sphere of Arbitration 
 
Chapters Six through Eight deal with problems in the international sphere where 
arbitration has a unique and growing role to play in the absence of anything like a unified 
global political system.145 
Chapter Six discusses international challenges facing arbitration.146 When it 
comes to resolving international commercial disputes, arbitration has a monopoly on the 
field.147 As Paulsson so correctly puts it, “We could live without arbitration. But if 
international arbitration disappears, economic exchanges would face a legal void.”148 
Why is this so? 
Within a national setting, a plaintiff can depend on the jurisdiction of courts,  
which the defendant cannot resist.149 But there are no international civil courts of required 
jurisdiction.150 The defendant must consent to appear.151 Because it is extremely unusual 
for parties residing in two different nations to agree to the jurisdiction of the others 
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145 Id. at 4. 
 
146 Id. at 174. 
 










the type of contract), international arbitration is the only vehicle to facilitate commercial 
dealings across national borders.152 
One might think that parties from different cultures and national backgrounds 
could clash during international arbitration, but Paulsson refutes that position by stating 
that all parties to any arbitration have the same expectations.153 Parties clearly have a lack 
of appetite for disputes because they contracted away from courts.154 Their expectations  
of arbitration are for justice to be served quickly, fairly, and effectively, at no cost to the 
deserving party.155 
Even though international arbitration is experiencing a golden age it is not without 
its criticisms. Paulsson discusses what he calls the inequality of arms within the realm of 
international arbitration.156 While most people present the argument that the very cost of 
arbitration is a form of serious inequality when parties financial resources are at separate 
ends of the spectrum, Paulsson thinks that when compared to the cost of litigation, and 
due to lack of empirical studies to confirm, the cost of arbitration isn’t a true inequality of 
arms.157 For him, the real inequality, which is specific to arbitration, is the supposed 
disadvantages of being treated as an outsider.158 
Paulsson further discusses three factors that affect the challenges of the 
international environment. The first, a healthy challenge, is the evolution of new entrants 
are being absorbed by modern arbitral institutions.159 Stable institutions accepting a new 
diversity of individuals into their decision-making organs has influenced other, newer 
institutions to do the same.160 There is a current culture of inclusiveness that is 
diversifying arbitral institutions.161 
The second factor that affects the international environment is the “[d]ogmatic 
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162 PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 182. 
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disrupt efforts to become more successful and integrated participants in international 
arbitration and this attitude can be costly.163 
The last factor is that modern international dealings are no longer the exclusive 
domain of professionals, whether in the public of private sectors, but also involve greater 
numbers of ordinary people like consumers, workers, and citizens.164 This presents 
significant problems of unequal bargaining power and a lack of understanding between 
ordinary consumers, workers, and citizens and the usual predominant parties of 
commercial international arbitration such a businesses, investors, and public 
authorities.165 
Chapter Seven focuses on national public policy in the international 
environment.166 The international environment adds layers of complexity to questions 
concerning whether the law displaces the contract.167 Not only is choice of law more 
complex, but the actions of judges and arbitrators are more intricate.168 For example, a 
judge might apply his or her own country’s law and choose not to defer to arbitration 
conducted in a different country, even if the arbitrators are acting in accordance with the 
law of that other country and with the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.169 Sometimes these 
concepts are very abstract and hard to envision, but Paulsson gives an example of 
recurring problems and complexity in the international context of a country that prohibits 
professional boxing and the sale of alcoholic beverages.170 This example is a brilliant 
discussion of just how involved arbitration can be in the international realm. 
Paulsson goes on to discuss how this complexity is “precisely the kind of thing 
that explains the need for international arbitration.”171 Because public policy is invoked 
in the face of an agreement signed by the parties, the issue arises whether or not a 
decision-maker should allow one of the parties escape that contract.172 If neutral 
arbitrators are not allowed to decide whether a contract is to be altered or voided because 
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of the alleged public policy of a home state of one of the parties the parties would get 
exactly what they did not bargain for, the courts.173 
The chapter then turns to what Paulsson refers to as “clumsy nomenclature” and a 
discussion of frequently cited phrases referencing public policy that tend to confuse rather 
than shed any light on the subject of international arbitration.174 His discussion of 
“domestic”175 (or “internal”) vs. “national international”176 vs. “truly international”177 
public policy helps make these confusing terms less obscure.178 
Chapter Seven ends with various discussions of the potential effects of public 
policy as it generally arises in practice: before a judge who is requested by a disputant to 
hear the case and disregard the arbitrator; before a judge asked to set aside or refuse to 
enforce an arbitral award; and before the arbitrator who has a responsibility to 
contemplate the usefulness of the arbitral award and therefore to “glance both sideways 
and forward to the courts.”179 
Chapter Eight takes a theoretical approach in analyzing the seldom considered 
issue of arbitral authority to reject unlawful laws.180 Paulsson refers to this chapter as 
possibly the least “necessary chapter in the book, but that it could appeal to the more 
thoughtful reader.”181 Legal philosophy is discussed at length throughout the chapter in 
an attempt to lay a foundation for Paulsson’s thought-provoking propositions at the 
conclusion of this chapter.182  Paulsson leaves the reader with ten “short” propositions 
based on the ideas presented in Chapter Eight.183 
Chapters Six through Eight probe the reader to think in ways he or she might not 
have up to this point in the book. Paulsson’s discussion and analysis of international 
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challenges to arbitration, national public policy in the international context, and arbitral 
authority is stimulating and forces the reader to delve more deeply into why international 
arbitration is all the more important to international actors. His analysis of key arbitration 
cases, as well as his ability to simplify the unclear is truly on display in these chapters 
focusing on international arbitration. 
 
V. PART THREE: CHAPTER NINE: IMAGES IN A CRYSTAL BALL 
 
Chapter Nine glances at the future of arbitration.184 It begins by discussing the 
fundamental inquiry of whether arbitration may be viewed as a completely self-sufficient 
system needing no aid from the state, only tolerance.185 The idea of arbitration is one of 
liberty because arbitration allows private parties to take their freedom of contract to the 
ultimate, final level to self-regulating said contract.186 No matter where parties come 
from, they tend to be dissatisfied by court systems that are costly and waste valuable 
time.187 Court systems, no matter where in the world, are stock full of critics that use 
examples of outright inequality, of genuine expectations being violated, and of hypocrisy 
to degrade these pillars of justice where any result less than perfect is unacceptable.188 
Clearly, arbitration seems like the logical counter to court systems because of cost 
savings, expertise, and efficiency, however those grand dreams often dissipate when 
claims actually arise and one party recoils.189 The tension between the two systems,  
courts and arbitration, remain even though some may look for arbitration to become a 
champion over law.190 However, Paulsson feels it would be a mistake to yield to the 
attraction of viewing arbitration as the victory for party autonomy over law because 
without paying regard to the law, decisions would not be final and courts would  
invalidate awards, making arbitration worthless.191 
It is only through cooperation between courts and arbitration that parties can 
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systems.193 Paulsson examines this proposition under the lenses of the relationship 
between judges and arbitrators, the shared objectives of courts and arbitration (i.e., 
justice), and how complimenting each other is the best way to achieve that objective.194 
As Paulsson puts it, “a legal system is unlikely to function very long with ‘good 
arbitration’ and ‘bad courts’.”195 
Perhaps the most controversial suggestion by Paulsson is also discussed in this 
final chapter: unilateral appointment of arbitrators.196 The ideal beginning of arbitration is 
the empanelling of a tribunal which is jointly agreed by the parties for reasons of fairness 
and justice.197 He proposes a default rule to be applied whenever the parties have neither 
jointly nominated the entire tribunal nor expressly stipulated that there are to be unilateral 
appointments, should be that all arbitrators are appointed by the neutral appointing 
authority.198 This has gained Paulsson many critics from arbitration academics to 
practioners.199 Paulsson ultimately thinks a party will insist upon the right to seek to 
appoint one’s own arbitrator because they hope that the arbitrator will share their 
viewpoint and values and not the overall picture and values of both parties.200 
The Idea of Arbitration ends much as it began, with a story of freedom and the 
necessary analytical approach to understanding the limits placed upon it, ideas that are to 
be respected and explored, and balances that must be struck in order for arbitration to 
remain a valuable legal tool in our ever changing society.201 
Chapter Nine accomplishes its goal and then some. Paulsson looks to the future of 
arbitration and really rounds out many of the ideas he establishes in prior chapters. For 
example, his unique idea for unilateral appointment of arbitrators stirs much debate and 
engages the reader with ideas discussed early in the book. While his proposed default rule 
has pure intentions, this idea seems contradictory to the fundamental view of freedom of 
contract. Isn’t the parties bargain sacred? Unilateral appointment of arbitrators is 
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something parties bargain for and should not be thrown away so easily. After all, there is 
no guarantee that institutionally-appointed arbitrators will lack the bias for which 
Paulsson is so adamantly opposed. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
The Idea of Arbitration offers a theoretical foundation for understanding how 
arbitration functions in the world today. It thoroughly examines the past, present, and 
future of arbitration by analyzing key, fundamental principles of arbitration. Paulsson is 
masterful at challenging the reader to think more deeply and possibly differently about 
well-known arbitral concepts. Through his use of questioning the reader is forced to 
confront ideas, and while Paulsson gives some background and guidance, it is ultimately 
the reader who arrives at their own answers. 
Despite the book’s length (301 pages), it feels less overwhelming because the 
organization was well thought out and planned. The structure of viewing arbitration in its 
past, preset, and future makes this book even more readable. Concepts and ideas build 
throughout the book and a concept that is discussed in the last chapter, i.e., freedom of 
contract, is understood more fully because the reader has knowledge of its foundational 
importance to arbitration and how courts, legalists, and practitioners have and do view it. 
If there is a slight critique to The Idea of Arbitration it is that sometimes Paulsson 
swings a little far into the theoretical aspects of arbitration without a proper foundation to 
escort the reader. However brief a reader might feel “lost,” Paulsson generally quickly 
swings back to center and captures the readers thoughts and attention. 
This book is an absolute must read for anyone and everyone in the law 
community. Arbitration is so prevalent in our society that every lawyer should have a 
working knowledge of it. To the law student with little to no knowledge of arbitration, 
this book will present all the fundamental concepts necessary to have a “working 
knowledge” of the subject (some cases are even analyzed and can act as a great 
supplement for an arbitration class in law school). To the seasoned lawyer that knows 
arbitration inside and out, this book will make you think about arbitration in ways you 
never have before. 
